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ARTICLE
CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON THE COMMON
GOOD: A PLACE FOR ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE LIMITS TO RELIGIOUS
EXERCISE
ANGELA C. CARMELLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Robust religious exercise, protected by the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment,1 promotes the common good. Religious freedom benefits
not only religious people and institutions but the entire society as well be-
cause it creates positive externalities. It fosters civic peace, pluralism, and
stability and helps maintain the boundary between state and civil society.
Religious freedom supports many fundamental social norms required for
the functioning of a free society. It has also been the seedbed for other civil
rights, contributing to free speech and to equal protection; indeed, the Afri-
can-American church gave birth to the civil rights movement, which
culminated in a national commitment to equality and nondiscrimination. In
short, religious freedom contributes to the common good; that is, the sum
total of social conditions that allow all people to flourish as human persons
with all the dignity inherent in that identity.2
The free exercise and non-establishment norms of the Religion Clauses
work together to protect freedom by creating a government that is relig-
iously neutral as among religions and incompetent as to theological matters.
These norms recognize that church-state separation limits the state and pro-
tects church autonomy from government interference with religious matters,
* © 2018 Angela C. Carmella. Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Paul Hauge, Christopher Lund, Catherine M. A. McCauliff, and
Charles A. Sullivan for comments on earlier drafts, and gratefully acknowledges the helpful com-
ments from colleagues at the Seton Hall Faculty Scholarship Retreat.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Other sources of protection include federal and state statutes and
regulations, as well as interpretations of state constitutions.
2. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHURCH ¶ 164 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM]; see generally Angela C. Carmella, Re-
sponsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common
Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403 (2007).
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gives churches and individuals generous accommodations to allow a vast
array of religious practices and ministries, and creates the conditions for
religious diversity, since religion is not relevant to citizenship. Over time,
these norms have shaped, albeit imperfectly and often with great social up-
heaval, the legal and social incorporation of numerous religious groups—
Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and more recently Mus-
lims and Sikhs, to name a few—into what was once a predominantly Prot-
estant nation. In short, religious freedom continues to be protected, not only
by the Religion Clauses but increasingly by statutes and agency regulations,
in large part because it promotes the common good.
Limits to religious exercise are also necessary for the common good.
No right is absolute, and free exercise is no exception. Just as both Religion
Clauses work together to protect free exercise, they also set its outer bound-
aries. As to the Free Exercise Clause and related statutes, courts sometimes
place public order limits on religious exercise.3 In addition, the Establish-
ment Clause provides an independent structural constraint on certain types
of religious exercise in favor of the common good.4 First, it prohibits gov-
ernment actions that threaten the integrity and independence of political and
legal institutions. This ensures that a church does not take over the reins of
government or wield significant coercive legal power over citizens.5 Sec-
ond, the Establishment Clause prevents government actions that privilege
religious groups and individuals in ways unconnected to removing a free
exercise burden or that privilege them in ways disproportionate to any rea-
sonable protection of religious exercise, thereby giving an unwarranted ad-
vantage.6 For the most part, the system works remarkably well: church and
state operate in their respective spheres, and thousands of religion-protec-
tive and religion-assistive programs, practices, exemptions, and provisions
3. An interpretive debate has raged for more than fifty years over the proper degree of
scrutiny to give to laws that burden a person’s religious exercise, as it is obvious that at times
significant countervailing governmental and societal interests must take priority over religious
freedom claims. In 1963, the Court announced a strict scrutiny standard of review of burdens to
religious exercise in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In 1990, without overruling prece-
dent, the Court announced a deferential standard for facially neutral, generally applicable laws in
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Religion-protective statutes like the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2017), and the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2017), employ strict scrutiny, which
allows a court to uphold government action where burdens on religious exercise are justified by
compelling state interests that cannot be advanced by less restrictive means.
4. This Article builds upon but extends Professor Carl Esbeck’s Establishment Clause anal-
ysis. See Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause:
Regularizing the Supreme Court’s Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359 (2007). Professor Esbeck
draws different conclusions regarding the implications of the analysis for exemptions. See Carl H.
Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause? 106 KY. L.J.
603 (2018) (distinguishing preferences from exemptions).
5. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
6. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
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are broadly accepted at the state and federal level.7 Sometimes, however, an
accommodation is an “unjustifiable award[ ] of assistance,”8 resulting in
religious privilege rather than protection of religious freedom. Of course,
judgments about those necessary limits to religious exercise have varied
over time, with the jurisprudence sometimes more restrictive and at other
times more relaxed.
This independent structural constraint on religious exercise rectifies
what Professor Carl Esbeck refers to as “religious” and “non-religious”
harms.9 To understand these terms, consider a society with a legally estab-
lished church, where the government also imposes on non-members bans on
worship and practice (religious harms) as well as civil disabilities (non-
religious harms). When that church is disestablished, non-members are now
free to worship and practice their own faiths; free exercise is promoted,
thereby rectifying the religious harm. But non-members are also now free to
exercise civic freedoms, which corrects the non-religious harm. Therefore,
the structural limits the Establishment Clause places on certain forms of
religious exercise—here, the religious exercise of a church backed by state
power—promotes religious exercise and rectifies non-religious harms by
redressing civil or economic harms unrelated to religious exercise.10
The Catholic Church’s teaching on the proper relationship between
church and state prioritizes free exercise norms and is largely silent regard-
ing non-establishment.11 The teaching accepts the independent jurisdictions
of church and government, eschews church privilege in favor of broad relig-
ious freedom for all persons and religious bodies, claims institutional auton-
omy from state control, and views the government as a partner in advancing
the common good on matters of education, social services, and health care
as long as each institution retains its mutual autonomy.12
In the American constitutional context, the American bishops, through
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB),13 have taken
7. James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic As-
sessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992).
8. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
9. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 364–65.
10. The arguments presented in this article are focused tightly on Establishment Clause con-
cerns and are thus to be distinguished from the growing criticisms of religious exemptions that
cause third-party harms; see, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Com-
plicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015).
11. POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (DIGNITATIS HUMANAE): ON THE
RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND OF COMMUNITIES TO SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN MATTERS RELIG-
IOUS (1965), https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html [hereinafter DECLARATION].
12. COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶ 425.
13. For a description of the evolution of the organization of American bishops, currently
known as the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Indif-
ferentism Redux: Reflections on Catholic Lobbying in the Supreme Court of the United States, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 993 (2001) [hereinafter Indifferentism Redux].
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the position that Catholic teaching prioritizes the Free Exercise Clause and
subordinates the Establishment Clause, viewing it as reinforcing—but not
limiting—free exercise norms.14 This produces a maximalist reading of re-
ligious freedom, which is constrained by public order considerations, but
not by non-establishment norms.
The USCCB’s narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause is
completely understandable, given the fact that the clause has been wielded
repeatedly (and often successfully) as a weapon against the Church’s efforts
to obtain government aid or participate in aid programs for its schools and
other public ministries.15 Indeed, many religious groups are loath to ascribe
to the clause a limiting role because it is often used aggressively and explic-
itly as a vehicle for secularizing society and privatizing religion.16 Never-
theless, it is this article’s contention that the rich intellectual tradition of
Catholic political and social thought could be mined for non-establishment
norms that limit free exercise in ways that promote the common good. In
this way, the Church could make an important jurisprudential contribution
to Establishment Clause interpretation that recognizes limits to religious
exercise.
By accepting that Establishment Clause limits to religious exercise are
critical to the common good of society, the Church can retrieve elements of
its own teachings to craft an understanding of the clause’s independent role
in limiting certain types of religious exercise—not only for religious free-
dom but for other non-religious civic values as well. The Church’s teaching
on law and politics is concerned with much more than securing its own
freedom; it recognizes clearly the secular nature of the state, the critical role
of non-state institutions in civil society, the protection of a broad array of
human rights, the public order constraints on free exercise, and the duty of
every group and individual to promote the common good.17 By making a
contribution to developing non-establishment norms, the Church would of-
fer an important counterweight to the very polarized discourse on religious
exercise currently affecting American culture in which maximalist free ex-
ercise claims are met with hostile attempts to restrict religion. Both ex-
tremes are unsustainable. A prudential approach to limiting free exercise,
rooted in the Church’s intellectual tradition, could help reframe both the
legal and civil discourse on the Religion Clauses and the common good.
14. Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-
Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2017) [hereinafter Catholic Institutions].
15. Id. at 11–23.
16. See, e.g., Highlighted Court Victories, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., https://ffrf.org/
legal/challenges/highlighted-court-successes (last visited Jan. 4, 2019); Legal Successes, AM.
ATHEISTS, https://www.athesits.org/legal/legal-successes (last visited Jan. 4, 2019); Religious Lib-
erty, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious-liberty (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
17. See generally Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 255 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela
C. Carmella eds., 2001) [hereinafter A CATHOLIC VIEW OF LAW AND JUSTICE].
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This article is organized as follows: Section II describes the Religion
Clauses, which work together to promote religious exercise, with the Estab-
lishment Clause functioning independently to limit some religious exercise
that compromises the integrity of law and government. Section III turns to
Catholic teaching on religious freedom and describes its American applica-
tion as reflecting a nearly-exclusive focus on free exercise norms. Section
IV provides some contemporary examples that illustrate the need for the
Establishment Clause’s independent limiting function. Section V locates the
teachings on religious freedom in the larger intellectual context to theorize
about Catholic non-establishment norms, while remaining in the framework
of free exercise primacy.
II. FREE EXERCISE AND ITS LIMITS: INTEGRAL TO THE COMMON GOOD
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses has produced not simply two separate bodies of law, but areas
of overlap, like the church autonomy doctrine and the ministerial exception,
which are rooted in both clauses.18 Indeed, free exercise themes pervade the
non-establishment jurisprudence, which is unsurprising given the fact that
the Establishment Clause is designed to be deeply protective of religious
freedom.19 The Establishment Clause ensures the independence of church
and state, the secularity of the state, state neutrality on religious matters, the
equality of religious persons and groups before the law, the irrelevance of
religion to one’s status as citizen, and the voluntariness of religious
commitments.
But the Establishment Clause is Janus-faced: it both promotes and
constrains religious exercise. The Court’s interpretation has produced a dis-
course of relationship between the clauses, in which it decides whether a
particular government action to aid or accommodate groups or individuals,
when not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause, is permissible under or
forbidden by the Establishment Clause. In this way, non-establishment con-
strains free exercise. In the clearest case, the church that believes its institu-
tions must be privileged and its teachings enforced by the civil authorities
cannot exercise that aspect of its faith. Of course, the United States has not
seen an established church since 1833, so little, if any of the jurisprudence
in this area addresses such clear-cut issues.20
Perhaps it is this dual identity of the Establishment Clause that is at the
heart of so much confusion over the clause’s meaning and proper applica-
18. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012),
the Court’s most recent autonomy decision, rests explicitly on both clauses. Id. at 188–89. Earlier
autonomy precedents rested on the First Amendment; see, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107,
119 (1952).
19. See discussion infra Section II.A.
20. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 n.20 (1963).
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tion. Indeed, there are many sub-fields within the jurisprudence, where mul-
tiple tests and approaches abound and where unified theories have been
offered and resisted.21 Conservatives tend to emphasize its overlap with free
exercise values, while liberals tend to emphasize its independent role in
limiting religious exercise.22 (Some liberals even consider it to function as
the atheist’s free exercise clause.) The Supreme Court interpretations tend
to fall along these political lines; with increasing conservative victories over
the last thirty years, the doctrinal arc has moved away from restriction and
towards greater protection of religious exercise.23 Yet the polarized dis-
course remains, with conservatives claiming maximal freedom and liberals
attempting to use the Establishment Clause to curtail religious exercise.
A. The Religion Clauses Together Protect Religious Exercise
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses often work together to
provide robust religious freedom. Even if both clauses are not explicitly
invoked in the same decision, free exercise norms and non-establishment
norms often reinforce each other.24 The Court’s first religion decision of the
modern era, Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,25 declared,
“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by
law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and
State.’”26 The Everson Court described many elements of the Establishment
Clause that promote and protect the free exercise of religion: the require-
ment of governmental neutrality toward all religious choices; no preference,
coercion, or punishment on religious matters; and no state interference in or
usurpation of church functions.27
21. For an attempt at a comprehensive understanding of the jurisprudence, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. 59 (2017).
22. Some scholars have emphasized that the Establishment Clause protects independent, ju-
dicially enforceable rights. See, e.g., id. at 89–90.
23. See Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, at 23–29.
24. Only a person whose religious exercise is affected by coercive government action can
bring an action under the Free Exercise Clause. Standing requirements are more lenient for the
Establishment Clause because of its structural nature. Professor Esbeck notes:
The Free Exercise Clause runs in favor of a particular rights holder . . . and so the
remedy is focused on lifting the religious harm from that individual. . . . The Establish-
ment Clause, however, is a clause that reduces the net power or jurisdiction of govern-
ment. No-establishment brought about a carve-out of government jurisdiction for all
time, not just with respect to the complaining party before the court, thereby reducing
the otherwise plenary power of the government [to undertake its tasks].
Esbeck, supra note 4, at 364. For a sustained discussion of standing issues, see generally Fallon,
supra note 21.
25. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding bus fare reim-
bursement program that benefitted parochial school parents).
26. Id. at 15–16.
27. The Court wrote:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
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The “wall of separation”—the classic non-establishment principle—
provides formidable support for free exercise norms. Although the meta-
phor has often been criticized by religious groups as an engine of seculari-
zation because it justified the ban on school prayer, the basic notion of
separate jurisdictions or spheres of church and state, in which religious and
governmental functions are segregated, comes straight out of early Chris-
tian thought as a bulwark for free exercise protection of the church from
state control.28 Thousands of exemptions throughout state and federal laws,
which promote the flourishing of religious exercise, are based on this notion
of separation-as-freedom.29 It is exemplified in Chief Justice Burger’s ma-
jority opinion in Walz v. Tax Commissioner, in which a taxpayer unsuccess-
fully challenged a church’s property tax exemption under the Establishment
Clause.30 In contrast to the challenger’s claim, the Court noted that the ex-
emption actually creates a more perfect separation, which prevents the state
from getting entangled in church affairs. Within a decade of Walz, the Court
(per Chief Justice Burger) interpreted federal law to exempt lay faculty at
religious schools from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board in order to avoid church-state entanglement.31 Non-entanglement
later became the third prong of the Lemon test,32 the dominant Establish-
ment Clause approach for a time. Non-entanglement, as it promotes separa-
tion-as-freedom, goes far in strengthening the category of “permissible
accommodations”—those free exercise protections that are neither required
by the Free Exercise Clause nor forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
Church-state separation and non-entanglement are echoed in the
church autonomy doctrine, which protects institutional free exercise by
making clear that civil courts have no authority to determine religious-ec-
clesiastical questions or to take sides in religious disputes.33 Since the state
is secular and has no theological competence, such intervention in religious
affairs would violate both free exercise and non-establishment norms.
These notions of church autonomy are particularly well developed in the
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.
Id.
28. Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Transla-
tion, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013).
29. See Ryan, supra note 7.
30. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
31. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring that state action have a secular
purpose, have a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and not involve exces-
sive church-state entanglement).
33. See, e.g., Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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employment context. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court determined that both Religion Clauses
require a “ministerial exception” from anti-discrimination laws to allow
churches to select their ministers.34 Chief Justice Roberts wrote,
The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands
of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an un-
wanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, in-
trudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action
interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving
the church of control over the selection of those who will person-
ify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state in-
fringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its ap-
pointments. According the state the power to determine which in-
dividuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in
such ecclesiastical decisions.35
Likewise, the Title VII exemption for religious employers is rooted in the
separation-non-entanglement-autonomy triad. This exemption allows relig-
ious discrimination in favor of co-religionists regardless of the secular or
religious nature of the job.36 In Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, in which
the Court upheld the exemption’s constitutionality, Justice Brennan wrote
that “[c]oncern for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that
we avoid the entanglement and the chill on religious expression that a case-
by-case determination would produce.”37 As in Walz, the challenger
claimed an Establishment Clause violation, but the Court viewed the ex-
emption as critical to preserving the overlapping, freedom-promoting
norms.
Neutrality affirms both non-establishment and free exercise norms. As
noted in Everson and seen in the disestablishment experience, the state must
not favor or disfavor religion in ways that can coerce, affect, or influence
the religious decisions of citizens, who must be free to make voluntary
choices. Neutrality is expressed in Lemon’s second prong,38 which prohibits
both the advancement and the inhibition of religion, and it is restated in
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which prohibits government actions
that intend or send a message to endorse or disapprove of religion.39 The
case law addressing religious discrimination or preference reveals both
34. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
35. Id. at 188–89 (emphasis added).
36. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987).
37. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
39. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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norms at work, with some cases arising under one clause or the other.40
Laws, on their face or as applied, that intentionally target, and thus burden,
religious individuals and churches have been found a clear violation of the
Free Exercise Clause in numerous instances. The State of Tennessee pro-
hibited clergypersons from political office.41 The city council of Hialeah
passed ordinances to suppress a Santerian church.42 The State of Michigan
made playground safety grants available to all schools except religious
ones.43 The civil rights commission of Colorado evidenced bias toward re-
ligion when addressing a religious defense to a discrimination claim.44 Such
targeting was also found to violate the Establishment Clause where Minne-
sota drafted its charitable solicitation statute to, in effect, disfavor the Unifi-
cation Church.45 And most recently, in the litigation surrounding President
Trump’s Executive Order banning travel to the United States from Muslim-
majority nations, the Supreme Court asked for briefing on the Establish-
ment Clause issue,46 yet some amici briefed it as a Free Exercise issue.47 In
sum, to single out religion or a religious group or individual for a particular
disability violates free exercise norms and also fails to recognize the secu-
larity and neutrality of the state in contravention of non-establishment
norms.
Given the considerable normative overlap of the Religion Clauses in
favor of free exercise, conservatives argue for a narrow interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, one that gives it weight only to the extent it rein-
forces free exercise norms. This has been the consistent position of the
Catholic Church as represented by the USCCB in numerous amicus briefs
filed with the Supreme Court.48 The Church’s normative vision is that the
Establishment Clause’s values of separation, non-entanglement, autonomy,
and neutrality should work together only to provide robust religious free-
dom. This includes generous categories of permissible accommodations and
permissible aid, broad protections for church institutions, and no discrimi-
nation on religious grounds. It especially emphasizes the freedom for relig-
ious institutions to work together with government on matters of common
concern, so long as each remains in its own proper sphere.49 But conserva-
tives generally, and the Church specifically, tend to reject an independent
40. Justice Brennan noted that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another . . . . This constitutional
prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of
the Free Exercise Clause.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1982).
41. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
43. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
44. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
45. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982).
46. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
47. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
48. See discussion infra Section III.
49. See discussion infra Section III.
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role for the Establishment Clause in limiting religious exercise. They accept
in general the “public order” limits to religious freedom but see little need
for setting “outer bounds” to religious freedom—at least not by way of non-
establishment norms. Under this approach the non-establishment norms and
free exercise norms appear redundant. Indeed, the redundancy claim is im-
plied in Justice Thomas’ call to un-incorporate the Establishment Clause.50
Yet Supreme Court case law on the clause makes clear that it does in fact
have an independent function that limits government in some of its interac-
tions with religious individuals and institutions. We now turn to this topic.
B. The Establishment Clause Creates Independent Limits to Some
Religious Exercise
Contrary to the approach of the Church and many conservatives, the
Establishment Clause acts independently to limit some types of religious
exercise. First, the clause provides the structural barrier that maintains the
integrity and fair functioning of government institutions for all citizens by
preserving independence from church control or intervention. This is the
corollary to church autonomy—churches enjoy considerable freedom as to
their identity, mission, and governance, but are powerless to wield state
power or otherwise intrude directly in governmental functions. Second, the
clause prohibits government actions that privilege religious groups and indi-
viduals in ways unconnected to removing a free exercise burden or that
privilege them disproportionately, that is, without regard for the rights or
circumstances of others. Both limiting roles can correct religious harms, but
they often have the additional or even the sole effect of rectifying non-
religious harms.51 A restriction on religious exercise might give greater
freedom for non-religious actions, or protection to non-religious people and
entities. Those who do not want to pray benefit from a no-prayer rule.52
Businesses benefit financially if they are not required to accommodate re-
ligious practice in a particular way.53 Teachers gain more academic free-
dom if they do not have to conform curriculum to religious tenets.54 Thus,
citizens may reap civil benefits where the clause strikes laws that give state
power to a church, aid a church but not its free exercise, or aid a church in
ways that lack balance or proportion. We now explore in greater detail the
clause’s independent limiting function.
50. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that clause’s original purpose is to limit Congress’s interference with state estab-
lishments). Such action would render the clause inapplicable to the states, thereby allowing them
to decide for themselves the proper relationship between church and state.
51. See generally Esbeck, supra note 4.
52. Id. at 364.
53. Id. at 392 n.159.
54. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 11  9-MAY-19 15:46
556 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:3
1. When Structural Church-State Separation Is Compromised
The Establishment Clause preserves the integrity of state institutions
and prevents “a fusion of governmental and religious functions.”55 Here the
wall of church-state separation is focused not on the freedom of the church
(as previously described) but rather on limiting its freedom. As early as
1872, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he structure of our government has,
for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from
religious interference.”56 That integrity involves several different considera-
tions. First, because government is secular, its members cannot be required
to profess any particular faith or religion. Just as religion is irrelevant to
one’s standing as a citizen,57 so it is with one’s more formal participation in
government. Thus, the Constitution prohibits a religious test for federal of-
fice, a prohibition that was later extended to the states in Torcaso v. Wat-
kins.58 Relying heavily on Everson and other early Establishment Clause
decisions, the Torcaso Court held that a non-theist’s position as a public
notary could not be conditioned on his declaring a belief in God.59 While
this could be viewed as protecting individual rights to participate in govern-
ment, a nationwide prohibition on religious tests for office also ultimately
protects government from capture by any particular church or religion.
Second, non-establishment involves the preservation of governmental
institutions: public schools, public property, and the public treasury. While
this principle is uncontroversial, the Supreme Court’s application of it has
been particularly troubling to conservatives, including evangelical Protes-
tants and Catholics.60 In the public school context, the Court has been re-
markably strict in its elimination of religious influences, as these schools
serve students of all religions and no religion. Religious instruction inside
the school building, devotional prayers and Bible reading either in the class-
room or any school-sponsored event (even a football game), and creation
science or the Ten Commandments in the classroom have all been found to
violate the Establishment Clause.61 As to religious symbols on public prop-
erty, decisions have been mixed, but the Court has twice prohibited symbols
from the interiors of courthouses, which are especially sensitive spaces in
which citizens of all religions and no religion gather for civic business of all
55. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982).
56. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871).
57. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
58. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
59. Id. at 495.
60. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (classroom prayer); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (creation science);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Ten Commandments classroom poster); Edwards v. Aguil-
lard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (creation science); Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (graduation prayer); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (football game prayer).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 12  9-MAY-19 15:46
2019] CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON THE COMMON GOOD 557
sorts. In McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU, the Court found a complete
lack of secular purpose when the Ten Commandments were displayed in a
courthouse under circumstances emphasizing their religious significance.62
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the Court
found that a cre`che displayed prominently inside a county courthouse dur-
ing the Christmas season sent an unequivocal message of religious endorse-
ment.63 Even though no particular church could be identified as the
beneficiary in these school and public property cases, the Court instead
found that benefits to Christianity in general were sufficient to violate the
prohibition on “laws respecting an establishment of religion.”64
As to the public treasury, the Lemon test quite aggressively prohibited
many forms of aid to religious (predominantly Catholic) schools, finding
that they had the primary effect of advancing religion and finding further
that any attempt to monitor the aid to prevent this effect would create exces-
sive church-state entanglements.65 The emphasis on non-entanglement sug-
gests that the Court was protecting the church’s autonomy from intrusion,
yet strict separationist “no-aid” dicta in Everson and many early Establish-
ment Clause cases, echoing Blaine Amendment language of the late nine-
teenth century, suggest an even higher value for protecting the public
treasury from Catholic claims.66 Conservatives, including Catholic bishops
in their amicus role, vigorously argued for moderating Lemon. Even though
there has been considerable softening on the school aid issue, there remains
a firm prohibition on the direct funding of church institutions for their relig-
ious activities.67
62. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
63. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abro-
gated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
64. This position in the property context may be changing, see Town of Greece v. Galloway,
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
65. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v.
Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
66. Throughout the nineteenth century, Catholic leaders sought public funding for their
schools. They wanted to be treated like the public schools because, they argued, public schools
were actually Protestant schools, given the ubiquity of Christian devotional practices. These
claims for equity in funding were met with intense opposition. Senator James G. Blaine offered a
constitutional amendment to forbid public monies from being controlled by any religious organi-
zation. While that amendment was never adopted, many states adopted their own constitutional
provisions that prohibited the funding of “sectarian” institutions or activities. Catholic Institutions,
supra note 14, at 13–16.
67. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801–03 (plurality opinion). For criticism claiming the breach of this
prohibition, see Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2030 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 13  9-MAY-19 15:46
558 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:3
The cases mentioned involve endorsement or aid to religious groups
that can compromise the integrity and independence of government. But
more direct and immediate concerns regarding the preservation of this inde-
pendence arise whenever there is delegation of civic authority to religious
bodies. Only two Supreme Court decisions describe such a scenario, which
attests to the widespread reality of structural church-state independence. In
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Massachusetts had enacted a statute that gave
churches and schools the discretion to veto applications for liquor licenses
within the vicinity of five hundred feet.68 After its application was rejected
because of a nearby church’s objection, a restaurant successfully challenged
the law on Establishment Clause grounds. The Court held that the “‘wall’ is
substantially breached by vesting discretionary governmental powers in re-
ligious bodies.”69 The state law “substitutes the unilateral and absolute
power of a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative
body acting on evidence and guided by standards, on issues with significant
economic and political implications.”70 The law violated the non-entangle-
ment requirement because it “enmeshes churches in the exercise of substan-
tial governmental powers. . .”71 and results in a “fusion of governmental
and religious functions.”72
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet, the Court also found a delegation of state authority—but this time
not to a religious body.73 A New York state law created a separate school
district for a Village whose population was entirely Satmar Hasidic. The
law granted the Village “all the powers and duties of a union free school
district.”74 Handicapped Satmar children from the village and elsewhere
who were unable to attend private yeshivas were sent to this public school.
But the Kiryas Joel Court made clear that a school district could not be
created along religious population lines. The Court noted that “[a]uthority
over public schools belongs to the State, and cannot be delegated to a local
school district defined by the State in order to grant political control to a
religious group.”75 The Court did not consider “constitutionally significant”
the fact that the law empowered the village citizens rather than a religious
68. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982). It was far more common for zoning
ordinances simply to ban liquor licenses within a certain number of feet of these sensitive uses. Id.
at 123–24.
69. Id. at 123.
70. Id. at 127.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 126.
73. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see also
Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding part of
the New York kosher fraud law unconstitutional); State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Family Life Servs.,
Inc., 616 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 2000) (delegating civil authority and discretionary powers on the
basis of religious criterion).
74. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 693.
75. Id. at 698.
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body: since the village lines were drawn entirely along “the lines of a relig-
ious community . . . we have good reasons to treat this district as the reflec-
tion of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of civil
authority.”76 The state law defined “a political subdivision and hence the
qualification for its franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful
and forbidden ‘fusion of governmental and religious functions.’”77
The religious groups in Larkin and Kiryas Joel only wanted accommo-
dations like freedom from neighbor nuisance and the ability to school their
disabled children, but the way in which those accommodations were
achieved violated non-establishment norms. Religious exercise cannot be
protected when it is achieved by a fusion with government power. These
goals were fully attainable through different means. The Larkin Court made
clear that there were legitimate ways to protect churches by using liquor
bans near schools and churches commonly found in zoning laws. And the
Kiryas Joel Court noted other alternatives to the creation of the special
school district. In fact, Kiryas Joel did get its public school district, ulti-
mately by way of a broad and neutral law that allowed any municipality of
10,000–125,000 residents contained within a larger school district the right
to petition for its own separate district.78
2. When Free Exercise Is Promoted Without Measure
The second category of limits to religious exercise focuses on govern-
ment accommodations that either lack any relation to religious exercise or
lack any consideration of any other non-religious interests. This involves
government actions that privilege religious groups and individuals in ways
unconnected to removing a free exercise burden, or privilege them in ex-
treme ways, without any consideration of impacts on others’ rights or cir-
cumstances, thereby giving an unwarranted advantage. The Court has noted
the boundaries to permissible accommodations: “There is ample room
under the Establishment Clause for ‘benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.’ At
some point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of re-
ligion.’”79 Drawing the line between lawful protection of religious exercise
and an unlawful fostering of religion admittedly is a challenge.
The Court has made clear that religion-only accommodations must
promote religious exercise. In Amos, mentioned above, the Court found it
essential that a religion-only accommodation lift burdens to religious exer-
76. Id. at 702.
77. Id.
78. LESLIE A. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION: CASES AND MATERIALS 59 (4th ed. 2017).
79. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987).
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cise caused by a generally applicable regulation.80 The Title VII exemption
for religious employers, which allows churches to engage in religious dis-
crimination (by preferring co-religionists in hiring) was upheld because this
exemption did lift a significant burden to a church’s ability to define itself
and its mission.81 Two years after Amos, Texas Monthly v. Bullock held that
an exemption that is unrelated to the promotion of religious exercise will
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.82 In that case, a secular magazine
challenged a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals. The plurality
opinion authored by Justice Brennan noted the contrast with Amos. Because
the exemption “cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-
imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion,” it constituted an “unjus-
tifiable award[ ] of assistance” to churches.83
The Establishment Clause thus demands a nexus between the religion-
only accommodation and the promotion of religious exercise. But even with
such a nexus, the accommodation must be crafted in a way that gives due
consideration to other significant interests (or that creates a mechanism in
which such consideration can be given). This lack of balance surely existed
in both Larkin and Kiryas Joel, where the accommodations involved the
compromise of government integrity. But even apart from the delegation
issue, accommodations without boundaries may collide with the Establish-
ment Clause wall. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor presented such an
accommodation.84
Given the demise of Sunday closing laws, Connecticut enacted a state
law that allowed any employee to declare a Sabbath day that employers had
to respect. The Thornton Court found that a law providing Sabbath observ-
ers an “absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they
designate as their Sabbath”85 had the primary effect of advancing religion in
violation of the Lemon test.
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and em-
ployees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to
the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing ob-
servance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The
State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automati-
cally control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute
takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer
or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The
80. “Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged
with benefits to secular entities.” Id. at 338.
81. Id. at 342–43 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
83. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
84. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
85. Id. at 709.
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employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of
the State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee.86
Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence that, in contrast to the Connecti-
cut law, federal law requires employers to accommodate the religious needs
of employees only after taking into account the business owner’s needs as
well as obligations to other employees (seniority, collective bargaining
agreements, and the like).87 Under this approach, Sabbath observers receive
scheduling protection unless that creates hardships for other affected
groups. There are problems with this approach as well, as it may be under-
protective, with many religious employees finding themselves without
workplace accommodation. But the avenue taken by Thornton—total disre-
gard of any other legitimate interest—is not an acceptable route.88
The notion of religious accommodations that fail to promote free exer-
cise in a measured way is further elaborated in Cutter v. Wilkinson.89 In this
challenge to the constitutionality of the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act (RLUIPA), state prison officials argued that the creation
of a specialized exemption process for prisoners’ religious practices vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. RLUIPA was unanimously upheld on the
ground that the statute provided for a balancing of competing interests. The
statute is structured so that the prisoner must first prove that a prison rule
substantially burdens his or her religious exercise; if successful, the govern-
ment must show that its rule advances a compelling interest, with no less
restrictive way to advance that interest.90 As Justice Ginsburg wrote,
We do not read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of relig-
ious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and
safety. Our decisions indicate that an accommodation must be
measured so that it does not override other significant interests. In
Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut law that “arm[ed]
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to
work on whatever day they designate[d] as their Sabbath.” We
held the law invalid under the Establishment Clause because it
“unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]” the interests of Sabbatarians “over all
other interests.”
We have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be ap-
plied in an appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity
to security concerns. While the Act adopts a “compelling govern-
mental interest” standard, “[c]ontext matters” in the application of
86. Id.
87. Id. at 711–12.
88. Professor Esbeck notes that the government in Thornton had moved off the neutral base-
line, as if it was “actively taking sides in favor of religious observance.” Esbeck, supra note 4, at
395. “Government may not regulate the private sector with the purpose of creating an unyielding
preference for religious observance over competing secular interests.” Id. at 392.
89. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
90. Id. at 712.
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that standard. Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of
the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal
institutions.91
The full meaning of what it means for an accommodation to be “measured”
is open to debate. There are competing views on how an accommodation
should be balanced against other significant interests.92 Some tend toward a
position that would save an accommodation nearly always, except perhaps
for extreme exigencies.93 Others tend toward a position that would consider
most negative impacts or harms to third parties to render the exemption
unconstitutional.94 Both extremes are unsustainable—a process of balanc-
ing is necessary to make these determinations.
Some principles help in the consideration of competing interests. For
instance, if the accommodation rests on church autonomy concerns, there is
greater weight in favor of broad exemptions and less weight given to relig-
ious and non-religious harms. The religious employer exemption in Amos
was autonomy-based, allowing religious entities (so long as they were non-
profit) the unfettered right to make employment decisions on religious crite-
ria. The interests of employees were properly disregarded in favor of the
overriding need for institutional autonomy on identity and mission.
3. The Result: Non-Religious Harms Are Rectified
Professor Esbeck has argued that the structural separation of church
and state rectifies religious harms (that is, by promoting religious freedom)
and non-religious harms.95 The Establishment Clause protects not just relig-
ious groups and individuals but all citizens because government represents
and acts on behalf of everyone. When the Torcaso Court ended religious
tests for state office, it opened government service regardless of faith—or
no professed faith.96 When the McCreary and Allegheny Courts restricted
religious displays in the interior of courthouses, they recognized that people
who conduct their civic business in such locations are all members of the
political community, regardless of faith—or no professed faith.97 When the
Court banned classroom prayer, it increased the freedom of religious minor-
ities, but also of non-religious students; when it banned the teaching of cre-
91. Id. at 722–23 (citations omitted).
92. Justice Ginsburg added, “Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account
of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries . . . and they must be
satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different
faiths.” Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
93. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW:
RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015).
94. See supra note 10.
95. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 363–65.
96. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
97. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 18  9-MAY-19 15:46
2019] CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON THE COMMON GOOD 563
ation science, it promoted academic freedom.98 When the Court limited
some types of aid to religious schools, it acknowledged the taxpayers’ inter-
est in not funding religion. When the Texas Monthly Court struck the sales
tax exemption for religious literature and the Larkin Court struck the discre-
tionary veto power of a church over a liquor license, they rectified the eco-
nomic harms flowing from those accommodations.99 Likewise, businesses
benefitted when the Thornton Court struck the Connecticut law allowing
unfettered Sabbath-taker rights.100
This line of cases demonstrates that sometimes religious freedom is
limited in order to ensure that all citizens have a secular, religiously-neutral,
fair government, with full access to participation regardless of faith or no
professed faith. Deciding whether a particular accommodation is an “unjus-
tified award of help” may be a difficult task. But such a category is an
inevitable warrant of our constitutionally limited government.
III. THE CATHOLIC INTERPRETATION: THE PRIMACY OF FREE EXERCISE
Catholic leaders have long considered the constraints imposed by the
Establishment Clause unfair, even hostile, to the Church’s free exercise.
This sentiment has been directly related to the Catholic view of the
Church’s own schools. Bishops have always viewed the ability of parents to
send their children to religious schools to be a fundamental right of relig-
ious exercise—and as early as the nineteenth century they sought public aid
to support that right.101 But state Blaine Amendments and early Establish-
ment Clause interpretations constrained that parental free exercise in the
interest of a strict “separation of church and state” and its no-aid policies.102
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Lemon test barred many types of government
aid to religious schools, with direct impacts on Catholic schools.103 Further,
Catholics and others have criticized separationist interpretations of the Es-
tablishment Clause as the engine for privatizing religion and secularizing
American culture, as some litigants treated the Clause as granting an affirm-
ative right to a religion-free society. Thus, it is understandable that
Catholics, among others, have argued for the narrowest interpretation of
non-establishment norms to push back the separationist tide and allow the
broadest latitude for religious exercise. They have been quite successful at
redirecting the law away from separation toward accommodation.
Free exercise and non-establishment norms now overlap in the educa-
tion-funding context. Over time, the Court became more tolerant of pro-
98. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
99. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116
(1982).
100. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
101. Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, at 11–29.
102. Id. at 15–21.
103. Id. at 21–23.
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grams that did not directly fund schools or their teachers but instead
allowed parents to choose a religious education for their children as one
among many options. Using this religion-neutral private choice concept,
conservatives on the Court began to erode Lemon’s dominance and the lim-
its it placed on religious exercise—even religious exercise that involves a
claim to public funds.104 In 2002, the Court upheld a school voucher pro-
gram that included religious schools.105 Indeed the shift has been so dra-
matic that, in Trinity Lutheran Church and School v. Comer, the exclusion
of church schools from a grant program was viewed as a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause and not, as the separation-minded dissenters saw it, a
mandate of the Establishment Clause.106
A. The Declaration on Religious Freedom and an Establishment Clause
that Serves the Free Exercise Clause
Church leadership has long rejected an interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause that has an independent role of rectifying non-religious
harms.107 Conservatives, associating this role with anti-religious hostility,
challenged the very notion of the independent constraining function of the
Establishment Clause. Such challenges have served the Church and other
religious groups well, as repeated argumentation has helped redirect the ju-
risprudence toward a greater latitude for free exercise accommodations.108
But for Catholics this is not merely a self-serving litigation strategy. This
position is driven by the Church’s own teachings. The Church’s Declara-
tion on Religious Freedom (the Declaration), issued at the Second Vatican
Council in 1965, sets forth the need for robust free exercise protection and
is largely silent on non-establishment norms.109 Unsurprisingly, the
Church’s American implementation of the Declaration has prioritized the
Free Exercise Clause over the Establishment Clause.110 Most significantly,
USCCB amicus advocacy—which presents its normative vision of what the
104. Id.
105. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
106. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
107. See infra notes 119–45 and accompanying text.
108. See generally Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, for the success of the maximalist free
exercise argument.
109. See DECLARATION, supra note 11. The Declaration is summarized in the COMPENDIUM,
supra note 2, at 421–22.
110. See Kevin C. Walsh, Addressing Three Problems in Commentary on Catholics at the
Supreme Court by Reference to Three Decades of Catholic Bishops’ Amicus Briefs, 26 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 411 (2015). Professor Walsh has written that:
The Conference’s briefs supply the closest thing one can find to the Catholic position on
questions of constitutional law, but it is important to note at the outset that there is no
such thing. To be clear: there is no “Catholic answer” to questions of federal constitu-
tional law (or any questions of federal law, for that matter). There is . . . a Catholic
teaching about the necessity for the Church to have the freedom to be a Church: to
administer sacraments and to gather the People of God. But there is no Catholic teaching
about the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. And so on.
When bringing Catholic teaching to bear on questions of federal law before the Supreme
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-MAY-19 15:46
2019] CATHOLIC THOUGHT ON THE COMMON GOOD 565
law ought to be—claims that the Establishment Clause is authentic only
insofar as its reinforces free exercise.111
The Declaration claims for all individuals and institutions the broadest
protection of free exercise, subject to public order limits (defined as the
protection of rights, civic peace, and public morality).112 It abandons the
Church’s former claim to legal privilege and its former teaching that relig-
ious error had no rights. It makes clear that government must not discrimi-
nate on religious grounds or “command or inhibit acts that are religious.”113
But because it is a document for a global church with a history of establish-
ments, it envisions a positive governmental role in accommodating relig-
ious exercise114 and even retaining establishments if those are historic in a
given nation, as long as free exercise rights are protected for all.115
In the American context, John Courtney Murray, S.J., the Declara-
tion’s main drafter, argued in the late 1940s for the primacy of the Free
Exercise Clause and a reading of the Establishment Clause that was in ser-
vice to free exercise norms.116 Murray reacted sharply against early Estab-
lishment Clause decisions of the Supreme Court that were absolutist in their
separationism.117 This free exercise primacy is a powerful normative stance
and has been the consistent position of the bishops ever since, as is evident
in the USCCB118 amicus briefs of the last fifty years filed with the Supreme
Court in specific Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases. The Con-
ference briefs often provide an originalist narrative of the framers’ intent for
the Establishment Clause to show its narrow scope: to prohibit a national
church and not to interfere with the state establishments.119 The Clause “re-
Court of the United States, the Bishops’ Conference makes prudential, strategic, tactical,
and legal judgments in deciding whether to file a brief and what to include in it.
Id. at 413–14. This is, of course, correct on one level. There must be room to make shifts in legal
argumentation, and ossifying current argumentation by calling it official teaching would be a
mistake. But legal arguments are made, consistently, publicly, and with authority. See Amicus
Briefs, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/amicus-
briefs/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); amicus briefs noted infra at notes 119–45. Over time,
the Church has quite clearly marked positions on given controversies to bring moral judgment to
bear. Thus, while there may be no “Catholic answers” to the questions posed, Catholic leaders
have never shied away from offering tentative ones.
111. See infra notes 119–45.
112. DECLARATION, supra note 11, § 7.
113. Id. § 3.
114. Id. (“Government therefore ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the citi-
zenry and show it favor. . .”); id. § 6 (“Government is also to help create conditions favorable to
the fostering of religious life. . .”).
115. Id. § 6.
116. John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol14/iss1/2.
117. See id.
118. See infra notes 119–45 and accompanying text; see also, Sullivan, Indifferentism Redux,
supra note 13; Catholic Institutions, supra note 14.
119. See, e.g., Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants, Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (Nos. 86-179, 86-401), 1987
WL 864775.
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flects the experience of its framers that officially preferred or established
religion generates religious intolerance and infringes personal liberty.”120
Church-state separation is therefore warranted only to promote religious
freedom and church autonomy (i.e., only to the extent that it ensures no
preference of a religion and no interference in religious belief, practice, or
governance).121
The USCCB accepts the notion, set forth in Section II.A., of overlap-
ping Religion Clauses, arguing that the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses should “be construed and applied harmoniously as complementary
protection of religious liberty”122—in short, that the Establishment Clause
buttresses the Free Exercise Clause. As to the Free Exercise Clause itself,
the bishops’ briefs give it a broad interpretation, contending that it is capa-
ble of addressing all conscience claims and all discrimination claims, and
that the Establishment Clause is superfluous. In the recent litigation in Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission concerning a baker
who refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding, the USCCB argued as
amicus that all conscience claims, both religious and non-religious, arise
under free exercise (noting that the state could not require even an atheist
business owner to provide a message she found offensive).123
The USCCB locates claims of religious discrimination solely under the
Free Exercise Clause as well. In the recent litigation over the travel ban that
disproportionately involved Muslim-majority nations, the religious discrim-
ination claim had been framed as an Establishment Clause violation.124 The
bishops’ amicus brief argued that the ban was an obvious violation of the
Free Exercise Clause, as the “text and context of the proclamation leaves no
doubt that it targets Muslims for special disfavor, failing the basic require-
ment of religious neutrality” under that clause.125
120. See id. at *14.
121. See Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lants, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (Nos. 84-237, 84-238, 84-239), 1984 WL 565475.
122. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (No. 84-773), 1985 WL 669821, at
*9.
123. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in Support of
Reversal at 22, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No.
16-111), 2017 WL 4131333, at *22 (“The Free Exercise Clause protects individuals and organiza-
tions of every faith and those of no faith at all. Whether Muslim or Christian, Jewish or Hindu, the
right to exercise one’s conscience is as universal a value as any the Constitution recognizes. It
makes no difference that Masterpiece Cakeshop is owned by a Christian. The same arguments
would apply if the owner belonged to any religion, or none.”).
124. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415–18 (2018).
125. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 8, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1605661, at
*8.
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B. The Embrace of Neutral Programs of Private Choice: Overlapping
Free Exercise and Non-establishment Norms
This notion of the primacy (and near-exclusivity) of the Free Exercise
Clause works together with the narrow interpretation of non-establishment
norms. During the Lemon era, the Conference argued that the Establishment
Clause was being used to limit aid in situations that did not “pose a realistic
threat of impairing religious freedom.”126 The bishops’ briefs criticized the
Court’s broad and speculative concern of the “excessive entanglement” that
might result from certain aid programs.127 The briefs argued that church-
state entanglement had to refer to actual and direct interference in religious
matters of belief, practice, or governance. “[W]hen [Establishment Clause
interpretation] is not so rooted, it can lead to the invalidation of government
programs which do not threaten authentic constitutional values.”128 Indeed,
the Conference repeatedly called for “A New Approach to the Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause.”129
Owing to the consistent arguments of conservatives (and a receptive
Court), the jurisprudence has shifted toward allowing, sometimes requiring,
neutral programs of private choice to permit participation by religious insti-
tutions,130 where aid is allocated on “the basis of neutral, secular criteria
that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both relig-
ious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”131 Indeed, the
Conference briefs have embraced this private choice model in both funding
and accommodation contexts, as it captures the notions of parental free ex-
ercise to choose a religious education for children, as well as freedom of
conscience, freedom from discrimination, and church autonomy.132 On aid
programs, the bishops consistently argue that if “funds originating with the
126. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990), 1983 WL 486389, at *16
(arguing further, “officially preferred or established religions generate religious intolerance and
persecution. Both components of the Religion Clauses were meant to work to the same end. If the
Establishment component is applied to reach results which cannot be justified in terms of religious
liberty, it fails in fidelity to the intended constitutional purpose. This is certainly the case when it
is used to invalidate governmental accommodation of activities of religious institutions which
serve the public interest and which pose no threat to religious freedom.”).
127. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
128. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants,
supra note 121, at *15.
129. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (No. 96-552), 1997 WL 86237, at *14. For a detailed
analysis of the brief, see Indifferentism Redux, supra note 13, at 1011–15.
130. See supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text.
131. Brief of United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 21, Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 15-577),
2016 WL 1639726, at *21; see also Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315),
2003 WL 22087619.
132. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
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government flow to religiously affiliated schools as a result of genuinely
independent and private choices of individuals,” there is no Establishment
Clause violation.133
The notion of private choice has also had a powerful influence on the
jurisprudential development of accommodations and exemptions. Of
course, the older ideas of separation-as-freedom remain: as the Bishops’
Conference brief in Walz noted, tax exemptions contribute “to the secularity
of government” as well as to religious freedom.134 Such exemptions “foster
the great objects of the constitutional mandate of separation: religious and
political peace, harmony and order, in our society.”135 But over time, the
concept of private choice got added to the mix. The Conference’s briefs
argued that accommodations, like the religious employer exemption in
Amos, create a space for private religious activity based on private choice.
By definition, then, the voluntary religious choices made within this space
cannot be ascribed to the government, even though the law itself has created
the exemption.136 Similarly, church autonomy protects the private choices
of religious institutions.137 The state does not advance religion—the indi-
viduals and entities are advancing religion by their voluntary acts, which is
just another way of describing religious freedom.
C. The Invisibility of “Non-Religious Harms”
The USCCB’s public position on Establishment Clause interpretation
does not recognize the value of curtailing free exercise to prevent or rectify
non-religious harms, as those are described in Section II.B. above. The clear
refrain that emerges in amicus advocacy is that any valid interpretation of
the Establishment Clause must support or promote free exercise. The Estab-
133. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779),
2001 WL 1480726, at *10; Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125
(2011) (Nos. 09-987, 09-991), 2010 WL 3535061.
134. Brief for United States Catholic Conference, Amicus Curiae, Walz v. Tax Comm. of the
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (No. 135), 1969 WL 119908, at *13.
135. Id. at *67.
136. Brief for United States Catholic Conference, supra note 119; see also Brief for United
States Catholic Conference, supra note 122.
The voluntary student activity in this case [an independent student prayer group in a
public school] is protected under the Free Exercise Clause as religious activity. . . .
Properly harmonized with the Free Exercise Clause, in accord with the authentic pur-
poses of the Religion Clauses, the Establishment Clause may not be applied to subvert
legitimate Free Exercise rights.
Id. at *21. The vision is further described: “Although the Religion Clauses enjoin the government
to be neutral in relationships among sects, the two Religion Clauses require a benevolent neutral-
ity which (a) accommodates the spiritual needs of the people (Free Exercise) but also (b) avoids
official preference or support for particular religions (Establishment).” Id. at *15.
137. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171
(2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2470845.
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lishment Clause is designed only to “avoid relationships between church
and state that [directly and demonstrably] impair religious liberty.”138 The
clause is almost never used to describe a limitation on free exercise139—in
fact, one brief, citing Texas Monthly, voiced frustration that “the line be-
tween a valid accommodation and an invalid preference is not clear, and
every legislative exemption still has to be defended against Establishment
Clause challenges.”140 The bottom line is this: if a court is going to curtail
free exercise in one instance, it should be doing so in order to promote free
exercise more generally. The Conference briefs have argued that the Estab-
lishment Clause should not even apply to situations of church-state cooper-
ation on health, social services, and education as long as “each institution
remains in its own proper sphere and the program only facilitates coopera-
tion to advance the common good of society.”141
Obviously, the USCCB’s amicus posture offers a vision of the com-
mon good: the human person flourishes in social contexts in which there is
robust religious freedom. The harmony of the Religion Clauses, as defined
by the framers, demands the broadest protection of conscience and religious
freedom for all. Thus, it makes sense to embrace private choice regimes for
government benefits, and to permit religious accommodations to create
“space” in which private choices are made. Even (and perhaps especially)
on controversial matters, they argue, “the common good is best served if
courts show deference to individuals and organizations choosing to exercise
138. Indifferentism Redux, supra note 13, at 1015. See also Brief for United States Catholic
Conference, supra note 121 (“The Establishment Clause was intended to buttress the Free Exer-
cise Clause. Applications which burden religious liberty are inconsistent with the intent of the
framers and are necessarily erroneous.”).  Professor Winnifred Fallers Sullivan surveyed numer-
ous amicus briefs from the 1980s and 1990s, and found a consistent claim for accommodation,
citing to briefs filed in: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (No.
91-948); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988) (No. 87-253); Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (No. 86-179); Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (No. 82-
195); and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (No. 80-689). Indifferentism Redux, supra note
13 at 1007 n.76.
139. The Conference’s brief in Hosanna-Tabor does provide an example of reciprocal limita-
tions: just as the state has no control over the selection of clergy, so a church has no control over
whether a person is eligible to run for state office. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, supra note 137.
140. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita Beneficiente Un˜iao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
(No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2211654, at *12.
141. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648), 1999 WL 631664, at *19 [hereinafter
Brief for United States Catholic Conference, Mitchell v. Helms]; Brief of United States Catholic
Conference as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)
(Nos. 87-253, 87-431) 1988 WL 1031758 (“Benevolent neutrality, not separatism, must be at the
heart of Establishment Clause analysis.” “Where a statute doesn’t directly sponsor, fund, or in-
volve in religious activity,” the Establishment Clause is not applicable. When activity is “purely a
social welfare activity, there is no need for this Court to engage in a detailed process to determine
whether the incidental involvement of religious organizations is legitimate.”).
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their consciences in challenging situations implicating their religious be-
liefs.”142 The Establishment Clause is “not a ban upon beneficial govern-
ment action that strengthen[s] the common good, even if religiously
motivated.”143 Nor should it “be construed as some sort of homogenizing
solvent that forces unconventional religious groups to choose between as-
similating to mainstream American culture or losing their political
rights.”144 To have an Establishment Clause violation, “[t]he State must be
directly and substantially involved with religion as religion, rather than con-
tact occasioned by cooperation with the public interest.”145
So why should Catholics give greater regard to the independent con-
straining function of the Establishment Clause, especially when its argu-
ments for a narrow reading of the clause have been so successful? For this
reason: just as the clause protects religious freedom and autonomy, it also
protects government from religious encroachment that can compromise its
independence and neutrality. Just as robust religious freedom offers civic
peace and promotes pluralism, so too with an Establishment Clause that
sometimes must curtail disproportionate accommodation to preserve that
peace and pluralism. These too are “authentic” Establishment Clause val-
ues. And good for the common good.
IV. THE NEED FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LIMITS: CONTEMPORARY
EXAMPLES
A number of contemporary examples call for Establishment Clause re-
strictions on religious exercise—some clearly, others arguably. In this sec-
tion, I offer the examples as ways to further consider the clause’s
independent function to preserve the integrity of government and ensure
that accommodations promote free exercise in a measured way, and to show
how non-religious harms often need to be rectified by these limits. My pur-
pose is to point out that Catholic advocacy, which does not engage this area
of law, could and should do so based on its own intellectual tradition. A
uniquely Catholic approach to Establishment Clause restrictions on relig-
ious exercise, the subject of the next section, could make a significant con-
tribution to the understanding of “responsible” religious freedom.
142. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 123, at *28.
143. Brief for United States Catholic Conference, Mitchell v. Helms, supra note 141, at *7.
144. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 140, at *21 (quoting
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bd. Of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. 687, 730
(1994)).
145. Brief for United States Catholic Conference, Mitchell v. Helms, supra note 141, at *11.
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A. When Structural Church-State Separation is Compromised
1. Church-State Fusion: Policing Policies
The doctrine of Establishment Clause limits is an essential part of the
jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses and restrains abuses of governmental
power by a religious group. The recent case of U.S. v. Town of Colorado
City provides an example.146 The Department of Justice sued the local gov-
ernments of Colorado City and Hildale, two towns along the Utah-Arizona
border. Those governments had been controlled by the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS, or the so-called funda-
mentalist Mormons) and its jailed leader Warren Jeffs. For decades, the
towns not only ignored substantial law-breaking by the FLDS Church, but
affirmatively did the Church’s bidding by engaging in housing discrimina-
tion147 and police misconduct toward residents who were not church mem-
bers—including coercion, intimidation, false arrests, unreasonable property
seizures, and denial of municipal services.148 The Federal District Court
found that the police department was deeply entangled with the Church;
indeed, the FLDS Church controlled and directed the department’s deci-
sions, leaving a long trail of abuses, like training and equipping Church
security forces and helping the Church harass non-members.149 The judge
acknowledged that “the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion,
on the one hand, and the statutory right to housing and constitutional polic-
ing on the other hand are vitally important to a viable, peaceful commu-
nity.”150 He found, inter alia, an Establishment Clause violation because
the evidence showed the fusion of government and religion, with the pur-
pose or effect of endorsing, promoting, and favoring the Church at the ex-
pense of non-members.151
This is an establishment marked by “the danger of political oppres-
sion” through church-state union.152 And we know from our own history
146. United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 3:12-cv-8125-HRH, 2017 WL 1384353 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 18, 2017), appeal filed. For some older cases of church-state fusion, see State v. City of
Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Ore. 1987); State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979).
147. This discrimination included coercion, intimidation, and interference in seeking housing
and discrimination in the provision of municipal services. Town of Colorado City, 2017 WL
1384353 at *5–8.
148. Id. at *8–9. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE., NO.17-424, FEDERAL COURT ISSUES
ORDER IN LAWSUIT AGAINST THE TWIN CITIES OF COLORADO CITY, ARIZONA AND HILDALE,
UTAH, FINDING WIDESPREAD POLICE MISCONDUCT AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (Apr. 19,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-court-issues-order-lawsuit-against-twin-cities-colo
rado-city-arizona-and-hildale-utah.
149. Town of Colorado City, 2017 WL 1384353 at *9 (finding that certain police practices
violate the Establishment Clause; other practices were found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fair Housing Act).
150. Id. at *1.
151. Id.
152. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 390.
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that disestablishment brings with it great religious freedom.153 But it also
brings freedom and equality more generally and restores political and relig-
ious institutions to their proper scope.154 When the local governments of
Hildale and Colorado City were rid of church control, their citizens could
be free: free to pursue their own religious exercise, but also to live more
freely in every way, unhampered by intimidation and fear.155 In this way,
when the Establishment Clause limits religious exercise, religious harms
and non-religious harms are rectified.
2. Church-State Fusion: Funding of Religious Schools
Other situations also suggest the compromise of church-state structural
barriers. In Montesa v. Schwartz, public school students challenged numer-
ous decisions of the Orthodox Jewish school board majority in East
Ramapo, New York, claiming that those decisions benefitted private
yeshivas at the expense of the public schools they were charged to serve.156
The students alleged that, for a decade, the school board had
promoted the Hasidic Jewish faith in violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution by (1) systemati-
cally funding Hasidic schools with public monies by manipulat-
ing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)
settlement process, (2) providing preferential treatment to Hasidic
Institutions when they attempted to sell and lease two school
buildings, and (3) buying religious books with public money and
loaning the books to Hasidic schools.157
The alleged effect had been to “siphon[ ] money out of the public school
system into yeshivas and other religious organizations for the benefit of the
Hasidic children’s religious education. . . .”158 Indeed, various state agen-
cies had taken actions against the district in connection with these matters,
to no avail.159 The Court dismissed the case for lack of standing.160 Had the
153. Id. at 368–69.
154. Id. at 389–91.
155. Remedies included injunctive relief against the police department for conduct in violation
of the Establishment Clause and the development and implementation of constitutional policies in
its place. United States v. Town of Colorado City, 2017 WL 1384353 at *12–15.
156. Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Merryl H. Tisch & G.
Sciarra, Op-Ed, When a School Board Victimizes Kids, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/opinion/when-a-school-board-victimizes-kids.html.
157. Montesa, 836 F.3d at 193–94.
158. Id. at 191.
159. Id. at 192–93.
160. The Court denied standing on the grounds that the students’ injury “is too far removed,
too attenuated, from the alleged unconstitutional component of the act of funneling-public-monies
to support the advancement of Orthodox Hasidic Jewish schools to constitute the type of injury
cognizable and compensable as the result of an Establishment Clause violation.” Id. at 199. A
vigorous dissent by Judge Reiss argued otherwise, id. at 201–05. For a discussion of the intrica-
cies of standing doctrine in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Fallon, supra note 21, at
68–70.
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Establishment Clause claim been allowed to go forward, and had the stu-
dents succeeded on the claim, the non-religious harms161 resulting from re-
duced public school budgets would have been acknowledged and
addressed.
A related topic involves the public funding of religious charter schools.
States typically require charter schools to be non-sectarian, yet many ques-
tions have arisen about whether certain schools are in fact non-sectarian, or
about the misuse of taxpayer funds when there are close financial ties be-
tween a church and the charter school.162
3. Church-State Fusion: Legislator Prayers
In addition to the funding issue, another compromise of church-state
independence has arisen in the symbolic area of legislative prayer. A circuit
split now exists as to whether legislators themselves can offer prayers at the
start of a public session.163 Prior to these cases, court decisions had focused
on prayers offered by clergy at legislative sessions. The Supreme Court has
found the practice of using a paid chaplain valid under the Establishment
Clause,164 as well as a municipal process by which many different clergy-
persons are invited to offer prayers, even if they end up being predomi-
nantly of one faith.165 These arrangements between legislatures and
individual members of the clergy at least could be said to respect the sepa-
rate governmental and religious functions.
But two recent cases involve local Christian legislators who them-
selves offer sectarian Christian prayers before a town council or zoning
board meeting, running the risk of the fusion of functions. Citizens chal-
lenging this practice argue that it compromises the body’s representation of
all, regardless of faith or no professed faith. The Sixth Circuit has upheld
the practice on the grounds that it is not coercive and falls within the tradi-
tion of legislative prayer.166 The Fourth Circuit, noting that “the identity of
the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional inquiry,” has invalidated
the practice on the grounds that it involves government-composed prayers
161. >For a detailed description of those harms, see Montesa, 836 F.3d at 198 (describing a
decrease in curricular offerings, programs, teachers, and guidance counselors; and the elimination
of assistant principals, specific extracurricular activities, including art and music, and programs to
assist immigrant students).
162. See, e.g., Doe v. Heritage Acad., Inc., No. CV-16-03001-PHX-SPL, 2017 WL 6001481
(D. Ariz. June 9, 2017); Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re
Approval of Hatikvah Int’l Acad. Charter Sch., 2012 WL 141495 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2012); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch., Inc. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 88 A.3d 275 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2014); see also Benjamin Siracusa Hillman, Is There A Place for Religious Charter
Schools, 118 YALE L.J. 554 (2008).
163. Compare Bormuth v. City of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (rehearing en banc),
with Lund v. Rowan City, 863 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (rehearing en banc).
164. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
165. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
166. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 494.
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and preference of one religion over all others.167 Curtailing this practice
would ensure that those who do not share the faith of the legislator (and do
not join in the prayer) are not treated differently, particularly if they have
applications or other civic business before the body.
4. Church-State Fusion: State Institutions and Religious Law
As the American Muslim population grows, questions have been
raised regarding the extent to which Sharia law can be enforced by state
institutions. The Establishment Clause provides the boundaries to issues of
this nature. The Clause prohibits courts from interpreting and applying re-
ligious law.168 So, for instance, a court would not be allowed to enforce a
will that asks the court to divide the testator’s property among his children
according to Islamic law.169 But courts can certainly enforce wills (and con-
tracts) that are religiously motivated, and typically do so without any regard
to the religious motivation.170 So a court would have no problem enforcing
a will that provided, by its terms, a division of a testator’s property among
his children that was in accord with Islamic law. The motivation would be
irrelevant.
Courts would also be prohibited from substituting religious law for
civil and criminal law or delegating to a religious authority any determina-
tions concerning civil or criminal penalties.171  So, for instance, a court
properly rejected a criminal defense by a husband that he could rape his
wife with impunity because religious law permitted it.172 As to legislation,
Muslim-majority areas, like any areas with large religious populations, may
legislate based on religious ethics (banning alcohol, for instance), but laws
that violate constitutional rights, such as free speech or equal protection,
would not be permitted.173
167. Lund, 863 F.3d at 274.
For years on end, the elected members of the county’s Board of Commissioners com-
posed and delivered pointedly sectarian invocations. They rotated the prayer opportunity
amongst themselves; no one else was permitted to offer an invocation. The prayers
referenced one and only one faith and veered from time to time into overt proselytiza-
tion. Before each invocation, attendees were requested to rise and often asked to pray
with the commissioners. The prayers served to open meetings of our most basic unit of
government and directly preceded the business session of the meeting.
Id. at 272.
168. Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 OKLA.
L. REV. 431, 437 (2014). For a general discussion of this topic, see also Muhammad Elsayed,
Comment, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments and the Establishment and
Free-Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 939 (2013); James A. Sonne, Domestic
Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717 (2015).
169. Volokh, supra note 168, at 437.
170. But not contracts that would constitute crimes, impair children’s rights, or discriminate in
certain circumstances. Id. at 435–37.
171. Religious law governs religious tribunals. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
172. S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
173. Volokh, supra note 168, at 453.
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B. When Religious Interests are Promoted Without Regard to Other
Considerations
1. Immunity for Religious Institutions in Sex Abuse Cases
In addition to church-state barrier issues, there are contemporary ex-
amples of accommodations that lack a connection to free exercise or pay no
regard to the larger social context. Both are at issue in cases against church
institutions for negligent supervision of clergy (and other torts) in the con-
text of the sexual abuse of minors. Many religious denominations, including
Catholic dioceses and orders, have argued vigorously for complete immu-
nity under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, on the
grounds that tort actions against the institutions would cause excessive en-
tanglement in religious affairs and would violate their rightful autonomy on
church-clergy decisions.174 Most courts have rejected these arguments and
have allowed tort actions to proceed.175 A minority of courts continue to
find that non-entanglement and church autonomy principles require
immunity.176
Churches have a significant interest in autonomy to select clergy free
from state interference. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court disallowed clergy dis-
crimination suits against churches because they would “depriv[e] the church
of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs”177 in
violation of both Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. In contrast,
there is no comparable autonomy interest in avoiding tort suits against
churches that allege negligent supervision of clergy who sexually abused
children.  The impact of Hosanna-Tabor, nationwide, is to give churches
freedom to promote their self-identity, beliefs, and mission. Had courts uni-
formly adopted an autonomy stance on the tort actions in sex abuse cases,
the impact nationwide would have had nothing to do with increased relig-
ious freedom. Instead, thousands of situations of clergy sex abuse would
have gone unaddressed.  With no legal accountability, churches would not
have made efforts at reform.  An entire class of individuals suffering great
harm from clergy abuse in religious institutions would have been deprived
of legal recourse, while those suffering harms from employee abuse in secu-
lar institutions would have claims that were legally cognizable and
redressable.
174. Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, at 47–51; Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of
Children and Young People: Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44
B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1040–41 (2003) [hereinafter Protection of Children].
175. Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, at n.272 (collecting cases); Protection of Children,
supra note 174, at 1040–41.
176. Catholic Institutions, supra note 14, at n.271 (collecting cases); Protection of Children,
supra note 174, at 1040–41.
177. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012).
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This sought-after immunity is not supported by a free exercise ratio-
nale and offends the Establishment Clause. It can be read as a breach of the
structural barrier between church and state, in which the privilege afforded
churches distorts the administration of civil justice. It can also be read as a
Texas Monthly-like situation in which an accommodation is unconnected to
the promotion of religious exercise, since decisions to ignore and conceal
the abuse had no basis in religion. Additionally, it can be read as a Thorn-
ton-like situation in which “the accommodation favored the religious claim-
ant in every instance”178 with no regard to the impacts on those affected by
a deprivation of legal rights. On any reading, an immunity from tort law for
institutions that mishandled clergy sex abuse allegations is nothing more
than an unjustified privilege for those churches. For states that continue to
find immunity, I would argue that the Establishment Clause bars any spe-
cial immunity from abuse-related tort claims against religious institutions.
2. Reduced Oversight of Secular Curriculum in Religious Schools
Other situations offer examples of disproportionate accommodations.
A recently enacted exemption for private schools—granted to benefit
yeshivas—reduces the state’s role in curriculum oversight, thereby allowing
yeshivas to focus more attention on religious subjects and less to secular
subjects.179 A lawsuit challenging the exemption claims that it “impermissi-
bly aids religion and entangles the government with religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause through the relaxation of educational standards
for ultra-Orthodox Jewish non-public schools.”180 Putting the secular cur-
riculum of religious schools out of a state’s regulatory reach is a privileging
of religion that disregards the educational needs of children—which are at
the very heart of any state accreditation of religious schools.181
3. Child Marriage
A similar disregard for the needs of children occurs when exemptions
allow child marriages, which are most often religiously-based (and usually
arranged unions between a young girl and an older man).182 New Jersey has
178. Esbeck, supra note 4, at 394.
179. Vivian Wang & Jesse McKinley, The Curious Case of the Yeshiva Carve Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/nyregion/yeshivas-budget-new-
york.html; see also Jimmy Vielkind, With Budget Stalled, Felder Pushes Moratorium for
Yeshivas, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/
story/2018/03/29/with-budget-stalled-felder-pushes-moratorium-for-yeshivas-337723.
180. Complaint ¶ 96, Young Advocates for Fair Educ. v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-4167, slip op.
(E.D.N.Y. 2019), 2018 WL 3545354.
181. Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003
BYU EDUC. & L. J. 363, 379–80 (2003) (“Courts have consistently affirmed the right of states to
regulate nonpublic schools. States have a substantial interest in ensuring that all children receive
an adequate education.”) (emphasis added).
182. Sebastian Malo, New Jersey Law Gives Momentum to U.S. Efforts to Ban Child Mar-
riage, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND., (June 22, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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recently enacted a law repealing such exemptions, making it the first state
in the nation to do so. It had been vetoed by the former governor in order to
preserve, in part, the “religious customs” of groups for which this practice
is common.183 Marriage is within the province of the state (which is why
polygamy is not permitted, and why Obergefell was necessary to allow
same-sex couples the right to wed);184 setting the ages for a variety of activ-
ities for children is also within the province of the state (age for employ-
ment, capacity for contracts, availability of contraception, and abortion).
Allowing the age of marriage to vary by religious community is akin to a
pluralistic legal system in which religious populations are empowered to
govern themselves on a host of issues (family law, the law of wills and
trusts, and the like).185 That is not a permissible system in the United States.
Again, here the Establishment Clause limits that freedom in order to rectify
non-religious harms to underage girls who are not able to fully consent to a
lifelong commitment.
4. Statutory Exemptions with Disproportionate Religious Benefits
Several statutes that attempt to protect religious conduct in the most
comprehensive ways raise possible issues of proportionality.186 Mississippi
has a conscience law to protect health care personnel from having to partici-
pate in acts that would violate their religious or moral conscience.187 Al-
most all the states and federal government have such laws, but they are
typically crafted to address particular categories of conscientious objection,
such as abortion, sterilization, physician-assisted suicide, and the like.188
Mississippi’s law, however, does not protect conscience claims based on
particular categories.189 Instead, it provides a right to object to any health
care service, broadly defined, by any health care provider, whether individ-
usa-marriage-children/new-jersey-law-gives-momentum-to-u-s-efforts-to-ban-child-marriage-id
USKBN1JI2X9; Matt Friedman, Ban on Child Marriages Conditionally Vetoed by Christie, PO-
LITICO (May 11, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2017/05/11/
ban-on-child-marriages-conditionally-vetoed-by-christie-111987 [hereinafter Ban on Child
Marriage].
183. Ban on Child Marriage, supra note 182.
184. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
185. See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat & Benjamin Shmueli, The Interplay Between Tort Law
and Religious Family Law: The Israeli Case, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 279 (2009).
186. See Mark Strasser, Neutrality, Accommodation, and Conscience Clause Legislation, 8
ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 197, 232 (2017).
187. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to 13 (2019).
188. See Angela C. Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons: Draw-
ing Lines Between “Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593, 1597–1605 (2017).
189. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-1 to 13 (2019)
(“[A]ny individual who may be asked to participate in any way in a health care service,” even if
not a professional or paraprofessional, may refuse to participate in “any phase of medical care,
treatment or procedure” that is a bona fide violation of conscience).
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ual, institution, or payer.190 “A health care provider has the right not to
participate, and no health care provider shall be required to participate in a
health care service that violates his or her conscience.”191 The statute pro-
vides that to “‘[p]articipate’ in a health care service means to counsel, ad-
vise, provide, perform, assist in, refer for, admit for purposes of providing,
or participate in providing, any health care service or any form of such
service.”192 Anyone refusing to participate is immune from any legal liabil-
ity and cannot be discriminated against.193 The decision as to what service
is objectionable is left entirely up to the health care provider, except that
refusals may not be based upon patient’s race, color, national origin, ethnic-
ity, sex, religion, creed, or sexual orientation.194
On the one hand, decisions under the Free Exercise Clause in Thomas
v. Review Board195 and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell196 seems to
invite such breadth. The Court in both cases deferred readily to the con-
science claim of a person or entity refusing to become complicit in a partic-
ular act, noting that the claim need not be “acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others” to receive legal protection.197 And surely there
are well-known moral scruples that go well beyond the usual examples of
abortion and sterilization, particularly now with technological advances and
the use of stem cells, genetic testing, and pharmaceutical interventions that
easily raise ethical concerns. It may be the case that comprehensive legisla-
tion is necessary because those who make such conscience claims in the
everyday world of health care may not be respected and the claims them-
selves may not lend themselves to easy categorization.
On the other hand, as a piece of legislation, this law appears to be
flawed in the way that the Sabbath law in Thornton was, and well beyond it.
Under the statute, the personal convictions of any individual in any counsel-
ing, diagnosis, or treatment situation overrides all else, in any health care
setting. Thus, a receptionist would be entitled to refuse to admit a pregnant
patient for genetic testing if he or she thought the patient might ultimately
make a decision to have an abortion; another employee would have to admit
the patient. Perhaps it could be workable if proper notice is given and em-
ployers are able to schedule and staff appropriately, but the completely
190. Id. §§ 41-107-3(a) (health care services defined), 41-107-5 (rights of providers), 41-107-
7 (rights of institutions), 41-107-9 (rights of payers).
191. Id. §§ 41-107-3(a) to (b) (any individual who “may be asked to participate in any way in
a health care service,” even if not a professional or paraprofessional, may refuse to participate in
“any phase of medical care, treatment or procedure” that is a bona fide violation of conscience);
Mississippi courts have not yet interpreted this statute, see Britton v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., No.
3:11-CV-483-DPJ-FKB, 2012 WL 1969136, at *6 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2012).
192. Health Care Rights of Conscience Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-3(f) (2019).
193. Id. §§ 41-107-5(2) to (3); 41-107-7(2) to (3); 41-107-9(2) to (3).
194. Id. §§ 41-107-5; 41-107-7; 41-107-9.
195. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
196. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
197. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
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open-ended nature of the protection, with the need for everyone else to bend
to any conscience claim in any situation, without knowing the possible sub-
stance of the claim ahead of time, seems to lack proportionality. Even the
Hobby Lobby Court noted that its broad deference to a conscience claim
would have “precisely zero” impact on others.198
The proposed federal First Amendment Defense Act (FADA) is sub-
ject to the same criticism.199 This piece of legislation addresses the post-
Obergefell world,
to ensure that the Federal Government shall not take any discrimi-
natory action against a person, wholly or partially on the basis
that such person speaks, or acts, in accordance with a sincerely
held religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or
should be recognized as a union of one man and one woman, or
two individuals as recognized under Federal law, or that sexual
relations outside marriage are improper.200
It intends to protect religious and moral views that favor traditional mar-
riage in order to “contribute to a more respectful, diverse, and peaceful
society.”201 This legislation has been proposed because, in the “culture
wars,” churches fear that their teaching will be considered nothing more
than bigotry and that they will lose the rights of free exercise and free
speech.202
198. 134 U.S. at 2760.
199. First Amendment Defense Act, S. 2525, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
Protection of the Free Exercise of Religious Beliefs and Moral Convictions: The Federal
Government shall not take any discriminatory action against any person [who speaks or
acts in accordance with belief or conviction of traditional views on marriage and sexual
relations]. (b) Discriminatory actions are defined as any action taken by the Federal
Government to: (1) alter in any way the Federal tax treatment of, or cause any tax,
penalty, or payment to be assessed against, or deny, delay, or revoke an exemption from
taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of, any person
referred to in subsection (a); (2) disallow a deduction for Federal tax purposes of any
charitable contribution made to or by such person; (3) withhold, reduce the amount or
funding for, exclude, terminate, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, any Federal
grant, contract, subcontract, cooperative agreement, guarantee, loan, scholarship, li-
cense, certification, accreditation, employment, or other similar position or status from
or to such person; (4) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise make unavaila-
ble or deny, any entitlement or benefit under a Federal benefit program, including ad-
mission to, equal treatment in, or eligibility for a degree from an educational program,
from or to such person; or (5) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, access or an entitlement to Federal property, facilities, educational
institutions, speech fora (including traditional, limited, and nonpublic fora), or charitable
fundraising campaigns from or to such person. (c) Accreditation; Licensure; Certifica-
tion. The Federal Government shall consider accredited, licensed, or certified for pur-
poses of Federal law any person that would be accredited, licensed, or certified,
respectively, for such purposes but for a determination against such person wholly or
partially on the basis that the person speaks, or acts, in accordance with a sincerely held
religious belief or moral conviction described in subsection (a).
200. Id. § 3(a).
201. Id.
202. Jonathan Rauch, Gay Rights, Religious Liberty, and Nondiscrimination: Can a Train
Wreck be Avoided?, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (2017).
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FADA, in its current form, prohibits the federal government from pe-
nalizing individuals, non-profits, and closely held for-profits for actions
taken on the basis of their opposition to same-sex marriage and pre-marital
sex.203 Thus, it prohibits the loss of tax exemptions and the withholding or
termination of federal grants, scholarships, contracts, loans, benefits, enti-
tlements, and access to facilities and fora. Traditional views on marriage
alone cannot affect federal licensure, accreditation, or certification. The pro-
tections are indeed broad, but they are not unlimited, as in Thornton. The
prohibition does not apply to publicly-traded for-profits, federal for-profit
contractors, federal employees, and certain requirements of health care fa-
cilities to protect spousal visitation and decision-making.
Is FADA a proportional response to the very real concern that the gov-
ernment might take punitive action against religious institutions whose faith
commitments involve traditional marriage?204 Does it protect the important
work done by churches in civil society while at the same time preserving
the goals of Obergefell? To get a sense of whether the legislation is “mea-
sured” and has given consideration to competing claimants, consider New-
man v. Piggie Park Enterprises, where a business raised a free exercise
defense to the Civil Rights Act to claim a religious exemption from public
accommodations laws.205 While an exemption was never seriously enter-
tained, imagine for a moment the implication of such an exemption: the
Act’s enforcement would have been subverted to a staggering degree, per-
haps entirely in some parts of the nation. This would have been an unfet-
tered exemption, available at anyone’s discretion, without regard to the very
people the law was intended to protect.
FADA’s inclusion of for-profits expands the statute’s reach signifi-
cantly, with no identifiable boundaries to the kinds of refusals that a busi-
ness can make. The statute would not affect state public accommodations
laws and anti-discrimination laws, but it might have the effect of encourag-
ing the refusal of services, as it  suggests a moral equivalence of commer-
cial and non-profit refusals. As federal law, it would allow objectors to
refuse to provide same-sex couples with goods, services, and access that
would be otherwise required by federal laws. Under FADA, then, a relig-
iously affiliated college and a for-profit landlord could both refuse housing
for same-sex couples without the loss of federal educational loans or federal
low-income housing subsidies, respectively. Perhaps a comparison with the
recent legislation in Utah, known as the “Utah Compromise,” would be
helpful: that law, the product of seven years of work between the Church of
203. See supra note 199.
204. See infra notes 224–34 and accompanying text.
205. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (referring to the separate opin-
ion of Judge Winter: “Defendants had argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was invalid be-
cause it ‘contravenes the will of God’ and constitutes an interference with the ‘free exercise of the
Defendant’s.’” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 377 F.2d 433, 437–38 (4th Cir. 1967)).
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Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and Utah Equality, provides exemptions
to religiously-affiliated organizations and specified non-profits while at the
same time requiring robust anti-discrimination measures in housing and
employment.206
FADA might spur the passage of comparable state laws; indeed, it al-
ready has. Mississippi’s mini-FADA (which also adds a provision on bio-
logical sex as determinative of gender and other explicitly religion-
protective provisions as well)207 was challenged on Establishment Clause
grounds, but the Fifth Circuit found that plaintiffs had no standing.208 This
reversed the district court, which had granted a preliminary injunction on
the grounds that the law prefers some religious beliefs to others and injures
citizens, giving traditionalists on the marriage issue an “absolute right to
refuse service to LGBT citizens without regard for the impact on their em-
ployer, coworkers, or those being denied service.”209
In sum, the outcome of these contemporary examples may be con-
tested, but they all raise the question whether independent non-establish-
ment norms should restrain religious exercise. While the accommodations
promote free exercise, curtailing such exercise would produce, in specific
areas, greater civil and economic freedoms and equality more generally,
protect children more effectively, and preserve the integrity of political and
judicial institutions.
V. THEORIZING ABOUT CATHOLIC NON-ESTABLISHMENT: THE INTEGRITY
OF THE STATE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPORTIONALITY
In the American context, the Establishment Clause prevents non-relig-
ious harms like threats to political institutions and to citizens. The bishops
could, consistent with Catholic teaching, employ non-establishment norms
that limit free exercise in ways that promote the common good—indeed, the
sources for these limits are already within the intellectual tradition.210 In-
stead of arguing exclusively for maximalist free exercise, the USCCB could
offer a prudential theory that recognizes and sets outer boundaries to ex-
emptions based on proportionality. A tempered broadening of the Establish-
ment Clause could result in an important jurisprudential contribution to
206. Laurie Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-passes-antidiscrimin
ation-bill-backed-by-mormon-leaders.html.
207. Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-62-1 to 19 (2016); see Strasser, supra note 186, at 235.
208. Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017).
209. Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 721 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
210. For a preliminary exploration of this topic, see Angela C. Carmella, Brennan and
Brewbaker’s Christian Legal Thought: Providing the Foundations for Establishment Clause Un-
derstanding, 56 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD. 39 (2017) [hereinafter Establishment Clause Under-
standing]; see also infra notes 213-37 and accompanying text.
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issues involving church-state boundaries and disproportionate
accommodations.
Catholic political and social thought suggests that it is beneficial to
treat religious freedom and its limitations as two sides of the same coin.
First, Catholic doctrine fully accepts the “separation” or jurisdictional inde-
pendence of state and religious institutions. Indeed, the Church gave birth to
the concept, as its ancient doctrine of the “freedom of the Church” recog-
nized that church and state have proper spheres of authority.211 Just as the
state cannot intrude on the internal church affairs, churches cannot intrude
on the government’s proper sphere. The USCCB’s amicus positions provide
that even church-state cooperation on matters affecting the common good is
legitimate only insofar as each remains in its proper sphere.212
Church teaching also accepts constitutional government and its secu-
larity, as well as its instrumental nature.213 The state lacks the power either
to choose a religion for itself, or to favor or prefer a particular religion.214
Laws have their basis in reason, not revelation.215 And constitutional gov-
ernment guarantees rights and equality—not only with respect to religious
freedom, but in connection with a broad range of human rights, civil and
political, social and economic.216 Government must also ensure stable soci-
etal conditions of civic peace and basic morality.217 Given these emphases
on rights and stability, there should be no quarrel with a structural con-
straint like the Establishment Clause that ensures government secularity and
institutional integrity as well as the Church’s freedom.218
Catholic teaching on independent spheres provides the framework for
analyzing (and disapproving of) oppressive establishments and the misuse
of public authority to divert public funds to religious schools, as well as the
application of religious law by courts (when not part of contract enforce-
ment). This same framework could also guide the inquiry for regimes of
immunity that completely thwart the administration of justice for an entire
class of claimants. Accommodations that deprive the state of curricular
oversight of religious schools, that allow religious populations to promote
child marriage, or that protect all manner of religious conduct, broadly de-
211. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶ 426. See also Garnett, supra note 28.
212. See supra notes 119–45 and accompanying text; see also Brief for United States Catholic
Conference as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No.
98-1648), 1999 WL 631664, at *19 (urging the Court to evaluate programs based on whether they
undermine institutional autonomy of religion or government and on whether personal liberty is
substantially infringed) (emphasis added); COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶ 425.
213. COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 168–70, 393–95, 406, 408, 421–22.
214. Id. ¶ 424. The mention in paragraph 423 of historic or cultural arrangements that favor
particular community is not relevant to the United States context.
215. Id. ¶ 398.
216. Id. ¶¶ 152, 388–89.
217. Id. ¶¶ 168, 422.
218. See generally A Catholic View of Law and Justice, supra note 17, at 265–72; Establish-
ment Clause Understanding, supra note 210, at 50–56.
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fined, are also capable of thwarting civic, political, or legal norms in ways
that compromise the structural separation, or spheres, of church and state.
Even with respect to legislative prayer, while the Church favors civic ac-
knowledgement of the nation’s Judeo-Christian heritage, the crossing of the
jurisdictional line by legislators themselves offering prayers should make
this practice suspect even for robust accommodationists.
Catholic teaching conceives of the church-state relationship within the
broader common good of an immensely pluralistic society. In addition to
the vigorous protection of human rights, the state must respect limits with
respect to non-state groups within society, like families, churches, non-prof-
its, and businesses as they promote the common good. Under this theory of
“subsidiarity,” government coordinates non-state groups to this end, usually
by giving them freedom, but also support, so that together the state and non-
state institutions work to create the conditions for the full flourishing of the
human person.219 Church teaching, through subsidiarity as well as the broad
recognition of human rights, understands that part of the state’s task in-
volves the balancing of rights among various groups and the protection of
all citizens.220 Moreover, the Declaration clearly recognizes that the state
protects all citizens, of different faiths and no faith, and that its public order
role calls for restrictions on religious exercise when needed to preserve
civic peace and public morality and to safeguard rights.221 It is but a short
step to argue that the Catholic intellectual tradition is open to the additional
limits that flow directly from the secular and independent nature of the
state, and its corollary, the restraints necessary to prevent a religious group
from usurping or thwarting civic, political, or legal norms.222 Thus, some-
times, religious claims will have to be limited to preserve the integrity of
the state or to protect citizens from “non-religious” harm.
It is also significant to note that concern for families and for the vul-
nerable are at the center of Church teaching.223 Given the depth of these
concerns, it seems that restrictions on unfettered religious exercise that
causes harm to children would be a clear implication of the teachings. One
might say these are simply public order restraints—which Catholics already
accept as part of free exercise interpretation. Yet the particular contexts in
which these issues have arisen necessitate specific mechanisms to prevent
religious groups from undermining critically important legal norms: by al-
lowing tort actions to proceed against churches in connection with clergy
219. COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 185–88.
220. Id. ¶¶ 168–69.
221. See DECLARATION, supra note 11, § 7.
222. Indeed, the Declaration provides that “society has the right to defend itself against possi-
ble abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of government to
provide this protection.” Id. § 6.
223. COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, ¶¶ 182, 209–14, 449.
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sex abuse, by prohibiting child marriage, and by ensuring the proper admin-
istration of public funds for education.
As to the question of whether an accommodation promotes free exer-
cise in a measured way, the Catholic concept of “proportionality” might
serve as a resource. Proportionality is familiar to Catholic moral thought in
teachings on the principle of double effect.224 The principle of double effect
provides criteria for determining the ethical legitimacy of well-intentioned
actions that also create unintended negative consequences.225 As part of the
analysis, one considers proportionality, which involves an assessment of
whether “the extent of the harm is adequately offset by the magnitude of the
proposed benefit.”226
The Supreme Court’s case law on the Establishment Clause seems to
echo these concerns of double effect and proportionality. The Court recog-
nizes that government actions (exemptions, programs, and the like) that
produce religious freedom are intended to promote individual well-being
and the common good, yet sometimes generate unintended harms. And it
engages in a proportionality assessment to ensure that the good achieved
outweighs the harms. Thus, the Court requires that an accommodation actu-
ally promote religious freedom,227 and that any harm caused by that accom-
modation be balanced against that benefit.228 Thornton makes sense when
224. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Dec. 24,
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/double-effect/.
The New Catholic Encyclopedia provides four conditions for the application of the prin-
ciple of double effect:
1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could
attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is
sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.
3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order
of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In
other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the
bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end,
which is never allowed.
4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing
of the bad effect. (p. 1021).
The conditions provided by Joseph Mangan include the explicit requirement that the bad
effect not be intended:
A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good effect and a
bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time:
1. that the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;
2. that the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;
3. that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;
4. that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect
(1949, p. 43).
In both of these accounts, the fourth condition, the proportionality condition is usually
understood to involve determining if the extent of the harm is adequately offset by the
magnitude of the proposed benefit.
Id. § 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
228. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720, 722–23 (2005).
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framed in this way, because the accommodation that protects Sabbatarians
without regard to anyone else creates non-religious harms that are out of
proportion to the benefit to Sabbatarians, who can be protected in other,
more measured ways.229 Amos also makes sense when framed in this way,
because even though the religious employer exemption is broad and may
harm employees who find themselves without work, the benefits to relig-
ious groups needing autonomy on employment issues are immense and can-
not be achieved in other ways. The “harm is adequately offset by the
magnitude of the benefit”230 and the accommodation is thus proportional.
The Bishops’ Conference accepts in principle that harms can result
from accommodations and that the Establishment Clause is implicated.231
Yet in application it has disclaimed disruptions or burdens to third parties
on the grounds that the harms are not severe and that far greater conse-
quences would result from the loss of religious freedom.232 The  proportion-
ality assessment finds that the magnitude of the free exercise benefit to
individuals and society sufficiently offsets any resulting harm.233 Indeed,
the experience of generous conscience protection after Roe v. Wade has led
the Church to champion this model of accommodation for other bioethical
issues and for matters involving sexual orientation.234
Surely, Catholic thought gives room for recognizing non-religious
harms connected to non-establishment norms, to be addressed with consid-
erations of proportionality. Church teaching accepts the reality of political
229. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
230. McIntyre, supra note 224, § 1.
231. Brief for United States Catholic Conference as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 212 (urging the Court to evaluate programs based on whether they undermine institu-
tional autonomy of religion or government and on whether personal liberty is substantially in-
fringed) (emphasis added).
232. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, supra note 123 (recognizing the non-religious harms of a wedding vendor exemption from
public accommodations laws but comparing this to what it concluded were weightier religious
harms:
There are certainly some social costs to such an approach. It requires Craig and Mullins
to seek their wedding cake from another baker, and it forces the Wiccan to do the same
when seeking a cake to celebrate Halloween. But that cost is far lower than that of:
forcing proprietors to choose between providing services against their consciences and
abandoning some or all of their livelihood; forbidding institutions of civil society from
expressing a diversity of views on contested moral questions; and, in turn, skewing or
stifling public moral debate on those questions, and reducing the number and range of
voluntary associations dedicated to serving the common good.)
Id. at *30 (emphasis added). That brief also noted that as an empirical matter, cases have been rare
and that none have involved directly discriminatory refusals to serve gays. Id. at *17; see also
Reply Brief for Appellant United States Conference of Catholic Bishops at *28, ACLU of Mass.
v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (2013) (No. 12-1466), 2012 WL 6057504
(defending the Health and Human Services grant to administer programs for victims of human
trafficking that accommodated bishops’ restrictions).
233. Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, supra note 123.
234. See supra notes 187–88, 199 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 41  9-MAY-19 15:46
586 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:3
compromise and adjustments in lawmaking.235 Catholics could support
broad free exercise protections while also accepting that there might be in-
stances of excessive harms that justify a limit on those protections. Widely
accepted statutes that seek to provide comprehensive protection, like
RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,236
contain a built-in restraint, so that even very broad deference to religious
claims remains limitable.237 Employing non-establishment norms to reach
exemptions that are more measured, Mississippi could revise its conscience
law to provide an enumeration of categories of conscience claims, and
FADA might be recast to protect only religious institutions from punitive
government action, without the protections for business refusals that have
no identifiable bounds under the statute. In these ways, the statutory
schemes could be more tailored to particular issues and the harms (i.e.,
health care and social service disruptions) lessened.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many conservatives will say that this “extra” role for the Establish-
ment Clause—curtailing rather than buttressing free exercise—has led to
hostility toward religion. But this is a mistaken assumption. The indepen-
dent limiting function of the Establishment Clause can and should be fully
consistent with robust religious freedom. This article has argued that the
Clause’s independent limiting function is necessary for the proper function-
ing of government and the continued viability and vigor of religious accom-
modations. The prudent application of the Clause in this way, when
accommodations compromise the integrity of government or promote free
exercise in unbalanced ways, contributes to the common good by protecting
responsible religious freedom within a pluralistic society.
The Catholic Church rightly gives primacy to the Free Exercise Clause
but could accept and develop its own theory of Establishment Clause limita-
tion. This theory could draw upon the Church’s teachings on the care for
the children, families, and the poor, the love of neighbor, subsidiarity’s pro-
tection of the multiplicity and diversity of non-state actors in civil society,
the state’s role in enforcing and protecting human rights for all, and the
need for proportionality in moral and political decision-making.
235. Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Conscience and Citizenship: The Primacy of Conscience for
Catholics in Public Life, in VOTING AND HOLINESS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL PAR-
TICIPATION 107 (Nicholas P. Cafardi ed., 2012).
236. See supra note 3.
237. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (interpreting RFRA); Cutter v. Wilkin-
son, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (interpreting RLUIPA).
